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Report

THE LEGALITY AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO INITIATE
AN INVASION OF IRAQ
A REPORTOF THECOMMITTEE
ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS
OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAROF THE CITYOF NEWYORK
No changes, substantive or otherwise, have been made
to this Report by the editors of the Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law. The Report was issued on
August 22, 2002. Less than two weeks later President
George W. Bush pledged to seek Congressional
authorization for military operations against Iraq.
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INTRODUCTION.

The Committee on International Security Affairs of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York ("the Committee")
has considered the legal and constitutional aspects of the President's
authority to order an invasion of Iraq without Congressional approval,
focusing on the scenario of a large-scale invasion proposed by the
Bush Administration for the purpose of regime change, without either
a prior attack by Iraq on the United States, an imminent threat of such
an attack or evidence that Iraq aided in the perpetration of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Our examination of the Constitution
leads us to conclude that an invasion of this nature would constitute a
war within the contemplation of the Founders and would thus require
prior Congressional authorization. We believe that such an invasion
solely on the President's orders would deny Congress its
Constitutionally-granted powers and could be justified only by an
excessively expansive notion of Presidential authority, one
unsupported by the plain text of the U.S. Constitution.
This report addresses the issue of the legality of a
Presidentially-initiated, large-scale invasion of Iraq in three steps:
(1) An examination of the Administration's stated rationale
for undertaking a large-scale invasion of Iraq;
(2) An analysis of the U.S. Constitution and other relevant law
underpinning the respective authority of the Congress and
the President to initiate such an invasion; and
(3) The conclusion of the Committee, based upon the
foregoing analysis, that such an invasion of Iraq requires
prior Congressional authorization.
11.

THE WHITE HOUSE IS LAYING THE GROUNDWORK
FOR AN INVASION OF IRAQ.

Since 911 1, the Administration has taken an increasingly
assertive, proactive stance toward Iraq. In October 2001, the White
House noted that evidence linked Iraq and the a1 Qaeda organization
which was responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001, but
found nothing specifically linking Iraq to the attacks on the United
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States.' In the State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002,
President Bush included Iraq in the "axis of evil," a list of those
countries that sponsored terrorists and possessed or were trying to
acquire weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, or nuclear
weapon^).^ He suggested that the United States needed to act quickly
against these nations but proposed no specific action^.^ In March,
Vice President Richard B. Cheney made somewhat clearer the
Administration's concerns regarding Iraq, a "possible marriage. . .
between the terrorist organizations.. . and weapons of mass
destruction capability, the kind of devastating materials that Saddam
used against his own people in '88," although no link to a1 Qaeda or
other terrorist organizations has yet been publicly shown or even
Recently, in a speech at West Point,
claimed by the Admini~tration.~
the President made clear that the United States could no longer "wait
for threats to fully materialize" but instead "must take battle to the
enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they
eme~ge."~
By late January, newspapers had reported that the White
House was planning an invasion involving over 200,000 ground
troop^.^ By May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had apparently convinced
I . See Interview with Richard B. Cheney, Meet the Press, Mar. 24,2002. With respect
to the connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, "[Wle haven't been able to pin down any
connection there . . . We discovered, and it's since been public, the allegation that one of the
lead hijackers, Mohamed Atta, had, in fact, met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague, but we've
not been able yet from our perspective to nail down a close tie between the al Qaeda
organization and Saddam Hussein. We'll continue to look for it."
2. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Jan. 29, 2002, available at
htt~://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
"States like these
[North Korea, Iran, Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to
threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose
a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the
means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United
States."
3. Id. "[Tlime is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I
will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not
permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive
weapons."
4. See Interview with Richard B. Cheney, supra note 1.
5 . President George W. Bush, United States Military Academy Graduation Speech,
June 2,2002.
6 . See generally Peter Ford, 'Evil axis' and others talk back, CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR,
Jan. 31, 2002, at 01, (describing U.S. invasion plans); Ian Bruce, Pentagon draws
up plans for invasion of Iraq, HERALD
(Glasgow), Jan. 3 1, 2002, at 11 (explaining Pentagon
plans to use ground troops to expel Hussein); William Rees-Mogg, The countdown starts for
Operation Saddam, TIMES(London), Feb. 18, 2002, Features (criticizing White House
plans); Eric Schmitt, Cheney, at Marine Base, Reinforces Bush's Stand On War Against
Terror, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 19, 2002, at A10 (reporting Cheney's efforts to gamer support in
the United States for action against Iraq).
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the Administration, which seemed to regard an offensive as "all but
inevitable,"' to postpone the proposed invasion of Iraq at least until
after the brutal Iraqi summer.
The Administration has also made pronouncements that the
invasion of Iraq is designed to replace that country's leadership with
one more amenable to the United States' current international goals.
Secretary of State Colin Powell said in recent testimony before the
House International Relations Committee: "Regime change is
something the United States might have to do a10ne."~ Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is quoted in June, 2002, in a Defense
Department Report document describing his thoughts "that the world
'would be a safer place if there were a regime change' in Iraq. He
pointed out that the United States and a number of its allies, backed
by President Bush and the U.S. Congress, have expressed agreement
on this because every new day means another opportunity for Iraqi
weapons programs to mature further. 'To the extent they become
more mature,' he said, 'obviously, the capabilities both for weapons
of mass destruction themselves, as well as the ability to deliver them,
evolve as
Finally, in what has been called "one of the
strongest and most detailed explanations by a senior U.S. official of
the need to oust Hussein""', National Security Advisor Condoleeza
Rice made a "moral case" for the invasion of Iraq:
This is an evil man [Saddam Hussein] who, left to his
own devices, will wreak havoc again on his own
population, his neighbors and, if he gets weapons of
mass destruction and the means to deliver them, on all
of us. It is a very powerful moral case for regime
change.. .We certainly do not have the luxury of
doing nothing. . .if Saddam Hussein is left in power,
doing the things that he's doing now, this is a threat
that will emerge, and emerge in a very big way.''
7. See Scott Ritter, Commentary: Behind 'Plot' on Hussein, a Secret Agenda: Killing
June 19,2002, at BI 3.
weapons inspections would clear way for war, L.A. TIMES,
8. State Department Report: "Powell says U.S. is Examining Full Range of Options on
Iraq, " Feb. 6, 2002, issued by U.S. Department of State International Information Programs,
viewed at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/O2020605.htm.
9. Defense Department Report: Afghanistan; Iraq, June 17, 2002, issued by U.S.
Department
of
State
International
Information
Programs,
viewed
at
htt~://usinfo.state.aov/regional/nea/sasiafghan/texO6
17dodmt.htm.
10. "Rice Lays Out Case for War In Iraq Bush; Adviser Cites 'Moral' Reasons," WASH
POST, Aug. 16, 2002, at 1, reported at ht~://www.washingtonvost.com/w~dyn/articles/A2 1333-2002Augl5.html.
I I . Rice interview with BBC, reported at htt~~://news.bbc.co.uk~lki/worldlamericas
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Thus, the Administration has made abundantly clear that such
an attack is based on long-term foreign policy, if not moral reasons,
and not on any concept of defending the United States from an
imminent military threat. Regardless of the validity of the rationale
set forth by the Administration, a massive campaign against Iraq does
not appear to the Committee to be the type of emergency defensive
action that is within the exclusive authority of the President to
undertake.
111.

THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY
TO ACT UNILATERALLY TO UNDERTAKE THE
LARGE-SCALE INVASION CONTEMPLATED.

A.

War Powers Clause

The text is simple: Only Congress has the authority to declare
war under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution: "The
Congress shall have Power. . .To declare War. . . ." On this there is
no question. Furthermore,
[Tlhe Founding Fathers drew a distinction between
offensive and defensive hostilities. -- The records of
the convention indicate that this was done to preserve
for the executive the power to repel sudden attacks and
to avoid the possible implication that Congress was
expected to conduct war. . . .12
As Louis Fisher notes, the Founders' decision to use the word
"declare" instead of "make" left the President the limited and clearly
delineated power to "repel sudden attacks" against the United States.I3
12 193426.stm, Aug. 15,2002. Brackets in original; emphasis added.
12. R. Turner, THEWAR POWERSRESOLUTION:
ITS IMPLEMENTAT~ON
IN THEORY
AND
PRACTICE, (1983), at 17 [emphasis original].
13. Messrs. Madison and Gerry jointly introduced the amendment to substitute
"declare" for "make." They noted the change would "leav[e] to the Executive the power to
repel sudden attacks." M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed.
1937), at 3 18, cited in THECONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED
STATESOF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION,
Congressional Research Service (1992), at 308, note 1420.
See Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting Under the UN and NATO, 47
CASEW. RES. L. REV. 1237 (1997) (arguing that the constitutional structure adopted by the
Framers is "remarkably clear in its basic principles. The authority to initiate war lay with
Congress. The President could act unilaterally only in one area: to repel sudden attacks."). A
number of leading commentators support this view. See generally JOHNH. ELY,WARAND
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The difference between the respective war power authority of the two
branches can be explained as the difference between "defensive"
military action against actual or imminent attack; and all other
military action which constitutes "war" under the Constitution, the
former being within the authority of the President as Executive and
Commander in Chief, the latter within the exclusive authority of the
Congress.14 The proposed invasion does not come close to the
exigent defense against imminent or sudden attack contemplated by
the Founders as within the Presidential authority.

B.

War Powers Resolution'.'

In response to perceived excesses by Presidents Lyndon B.
Johnson and Richard Nixon in initiating and expanding the war in
South-East Asia, Congress resolved in 1973 to clarify its sole
authority to declare war. The War Powers Resolution (the " W P R )
requires the President to report to and regularly consult with Congress
after unilaterally choosing to deploy U.S. armed forces.I6 Unless
RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL
LESSONS
OF VIETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1993); LOUIS
HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM,
DEMOCRACY,
AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
(1990); HAROLD
H. KOH,
AFFAIR
THENATIONAL
SECURITY
CONSTITUTION:
SHARING
POWERAFTERTHE IRAN-CONTRA
(1990); MICHAEL
J. GLENNON,
CONSTITUTIONAL
DIPLOMACY
(1990); Lori Fisler Damrosch,
Constitutional Control Over War Powers: A Common Core of'Accountability in Democratic
Societies.?, 50 U. MIAMIL. REV. 181 (1995) (arguing that "the body of experience of the

mature democracies in their war-and-peace decisions reflects a common core of commitment
to democratic accountability."). See also S. Con. Res. 133, 107th Cong. (2002) referred to
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (expressing "the sense of Congress that the United
States should not use force against Iraq, outside of the existing Rules of Engagement, without
specific statutory authorization or a declaration of war under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11
of the Constitution of the United States").
14. See, e.g., William Whiting, WARPOWERS
UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED
STATES(1871), at 38-40: "Congress has the sole power, under the constitution, to make [a]
declaration [of war], and to sanction or authorize the commencement of offensive war. . .
But this is quite a different case from a defensive . . . war. The constitution establishes the
mode in which this government shall commence wars, the authority which may authorize,
and the declarations which shall precede, any act of hostility; but it has no power to prescribe
the manner in which others should begin war against us."
15. See 50 U.S.C. $5 1541-1548.
16. The WPR seeks to prevent the President from abusing both his authority as
Commander-in-Chief and his ability to respond more quickly than Congress, as the President
may deploy troops and undertake a military action that does not constitute a response to a
sudden or imminent attack before Congress can act at all, or he may deploy a sufficient
number of troops quickly enough to create a self-fulfilling prophecy-(that to remove U.S.
forces immediately after deploying them would be irresponsible and dangerous). If the
President can commit troops offensively and only consult Congress when hostilities become
inevitable (i.e., shoot and ask questions later), then Congress has no real war powers. See
Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military
Engagements, 89 AM.J . INT'LL. 58 (1994) (arguing that in the post-Cold War era, it is more
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Congress otherwise authorizes the military action, the WPR seeks to
require the President to withdraw armed forces within sixty days of
deploying them. A Congressional declaration of war or enabling
resolution waives these requirements and gives the President the full
power to conduct a war. Some argue that the WPR is ineffective or
even unconstitutional as it seeks to alter the Constitutional war
powers framework and note that no President has recognized its
constitutionality. However, in large-scale conflicts, Presidents have
sought Congressional authorization, most notably in the most closely
analogous military action when President George H.W. Bush sought
support of Congress for the Gulf War of 199 1.

C.

Arguments for Executive Authority to Initiate War

Some writers have argued that the Founders reserved for the
President the power to initiate wars and gave Congress the power
merely to ratify them, i.e., decide the legal status of the conflict
initiated by the President."
These writers deny the authority
expressly granted to Congress under the Constitution and argue in
support of the President's authority to undertake unilateral action by
positing that the President has the "inherent executive authority" to
initiate wars, as Commander-in-Chief under Article 11, Section 218 and
as part of his generic powers as President.19 This argument, if
important than ever to have "robust parliamentary debate and genuine deliberation" before
military action, as required by WPR and the War Powers Clause). See also infia Part 1I.F
(arguing that Congressional appropriations or other measures after military deployment are
insufficient checks against unilateral action by the President).
17. See generally John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF.L. REV. 167 (1996). Yoo argues that the
Founders understood declarations of war not as legislative authorization to initiate war but as
a mere acknowledgement by Congress that the legal status had changed, from peace to war,
between the United States and a hostile state. It alerted all nations that violence committed
against hostile states was official and public, not the work of pirates or rebels, and alerts U.S.
citizens about the identity of the new enemy. Yoo calls this a Congressional exercise of
judicial powers. See id. at 205.
18. Some argue that the President has more explicit and unchecked authority to use the
armed forces under Article 11, Section 2 ("President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into
actual Service of the United States."). See generally Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo,
The President S Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist
Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y
487 (2002).
19. See Yoo, supra note 17, at 252-56 (arguing that President's war powers were
continuation of British and colonial traditions and that 18th Century citizens expected a
"paternal figure vested with the duty of protecting his fellow citizens.").
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accepted, gives the President wide-ranging powers to use force-not
just to repel a sudden attack but also to initiate full-scale offensives as
part of the war against terr~rism.~'According to this view, Congress
has also waived its authority over the years by acquiescing to
numerous wars initiated by the Pre~ident.~'
These arguments deny or miscast the plain text of the
Constitution granting Congress the sole authority to declare war.
Conversely, no text gives the President the discretion to deploy U.S.
forces without Congressional approval in the absence of a sudden
danger to national security, not even for the "moral" reasons or
concerns of "emerging" threats cited by the Admini~tration.~~
Advocates of unilateral executive authority over war powers
also claim to bring an originalist understanding to the War Powers
clause that contradicts both the text and the clear (originalist)
evidence that the Founders wished to prevent the President from
having strong war powers.23 Advocates of inherent executive
authority to initiate wars argue that the American conception of
executive war powers was largely shaped by Britain, even though the
colonies revolted from Britain in part, as a reaction to the excess of
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

20. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 18, at 487 ("[Tlhe President had the innate power
not only to retaliate against any person, organization, or state suspected of involvement in
terrorist attacks on the United States, but also against foreign states suspected of harboring or
supporting such organizations."). Authors are in the Office of Legal Counsel of the
Department of Justice (but do not claim to state official views of the Justice Department).
21. See John Yoo, CIio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U .
COLO.L. REV.1 169, 1 179 (1999) (arguing that Congress has allowed the President to assume
the initiative in war).
22. See D.A. Jeremy Telman, A Truism That Isn't True? The Tenth Amendment and
Executive War Power, 51 CATH.U . L. REV. 135, 189 (responding to Yoo and others who
argue for increased executive war powers by arguing that such powers can only come from a
theory of inherent authority because "there is no basis, in the constitutional text, in the
writings of the Framers, in political theory, or in the constitutional history of the United
States for transferring powers invested in the Legislature to the Executive."). Critics like
Yoo read "declare war" out of context, separating from neighboring clauses that clearly
enumerate the power to raise, support, and regulate the armed forces (CI. 12-16), all part and
parcel of control when and how the United States goes to war.
23. James Madison said that the Constitution "supposes . . . that the Executive is the
branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly, with studied
care, vested the question of war in the Legislature." James Madison, Letter From James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Apr. 2, 1798, in 6 THEWRITINGS
OF JAMES
MADISON,
3 1 1,312
(Gaillard Hunt Ed., 1906) (cited by Telman, supra note 22, at 152). Furthermore, during the
Constitutional Convention, no one even seconded a motion to give the President the power to
OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION
OF 1787, (Max Farrand ed.,
initiate wars. See 2 RECORDS
1937) (cited by Telman, supra note 22, at 152). Finally, Madison argued that the system of
checks and balances required that Congress control the decision to initiate war: "Those who
are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war
ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded." James Madison, Helvidius No. 1, in 6
THEWRITINGS
OF JAMES
MADISON
145 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
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British executive power they had e ~ p e r i e n c e d .The
~ ~ President's role
as Commander-in-Chief emphasizes civilian control over the military
and, absent an immediate threat to the nation requiring defense, only
gives him the power to execute Congress' decision to commence a
war.25 Many Founders believed war declarations were simply not an
executive function.26

D.

UN or NATO Authorization

Some scholars argue that the President may undertake a
military action without Congressional authorization if the UN or
NATO has authorized such an action.27 By this view, the purpose of
the "declare war" clause is to ensure that the decision to initiate war
does not rest with just one person. UN authorization avoids this
problem, perhaps even more effectively than does Congress'
authorization, because the Security Council "is far less likely to be
~ examples,
stampeded by combat fever than is C ~ n g r e s s . " ~As
proponents of this view observe that Presidents, on two previous
24. See Telman, supra note 22, at 180 ("Yoo's theory ignores the great efforts
expended in the Revolutionary Era to free the United States from the problems associated
with the excesses of executive power experienced when the American states had the status of
English colonies."). Even Alexander Hamilton, once an advocate of constitutional
monarchy, conceded that the powers granted the President were much inferior to those
granted the King of Great Britain, who could declare war and raise and regulate armies. Id.
at 182.
25. Hamilton argued at the Constitutional Convention that the executive's war time
functions were "to have the direction of war when authorized or begun"; nothing in his
statement to the Convention indicated that the President should also have the power to decide
whether to start a war. 5 DEBATES
IN THESEVERAL
STATECONVENTIONS,
ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION,
AS RECOMMEND
BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION
AT
PHILADELPHIA,
IN 1787, at 205 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1996).
This paper takes no position with respect to the authority the President may have to employ
the armed forces in military operations other than war, such as peacekeeping, disaster relief,
peacetime garrisons in foreign bases, training of U.S. and allied forces abroad and the like.
26. Madison, Helvidius No. I, supra note 23, at 148. "A declaration that there shall be
war is not an execution of laws: it does not suppose pre-existing laws to be executed: it is not,
in any respect, an act merely executive."
27. See generally Thomas M . Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War:
"The Old Order Changeth, " 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 63 (1991).
28. Id. at 74. "The purpose of the war-declaring clause was to ensure that this fateful
decision did not rest with a single person. The new system vests that responsibility in the
Security Council, a body where the most divergent interests and perspectives of humanity are
represented and where five of fifteen members have a veto power." Id. As a practical matter
of restraining the President, it may be true that the Security Council, made up of different
member states with different and often conflicting political interests, is less likely to
authorize the use of American force than Congress. Such support seems unlikely under the
circumstances.
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occasions, have deployed U.S. forces pursuant to Security Council
authorizations: the Korean War29and the 1991 Gulf War.30
UN or NATO authorization does not absolve the President of
his Constitutional duty to obtain Congress' approval. Whether the
Security Council approves of an invasion of Iraq or not,31 the
Constitution requires Congressional authorization for war. Treaty
obligations, such as those under the UN Charter or NATO Treaty, are
equivalent to federal statutory law32 and, as such, never trump the
C~nstitution.~~
Arguments relying on the Korean and Gulf Wars as examples
are unconvincing. President Harry S. Truman's order sending U.S.
forces to Korea might be viewed as repelling a sudden attack-the
North Korean invasion had nearly overrun South Korea, threatening
irreparable harm to U.S. security interests.34 In any case, it appears
that President Truman sought UN approval as a fig leaf for acting
29. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 18, at 504 ("Perhaps the most significant operation
exercised on the President's sole authority occurred during the Korean War, when President
Truman ordered United States troops to fight a war that lasted for over three years and
resulted in over 142,000 American casualties.").
30. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 1266 (observing that during the Gulf War, Richard B.
Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, argued that Congressional authorization was not necessary
for UN-approved actions).
31. Recent history suggests that three of five permanent members (Russia, China,
France) of the Security Council would oppose an invasion of Iraq. RICHARD
BUTLER,
THE
OF MASSDESTRUCTION,
AND THE GROWING
CRISISOF
GREATEST
THREAT:
IRAQ, WEAPONS
GLOBAL
SECURITY
9 1, 220-2 1 (2000) (describing Russian, French, and Chinese support for
ending sanctions against Iraq, despite the lack of Iraqi compliance with LJN weapons
inspection regime, and self-interested political motives for this support).
32. See U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
33. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)
OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS
LAW l l I, Comment (a) ("In their
character as law of the United States, rules of international law and provisions of
international agreements of the United States are subject to the Bill of Rights and other
prohibitions, restrictions, and requirements of the Constitution, and cannot be given effect in
violation of them.").
34. Truman's advisers believed that the sudden North Korean attack required an
immediate U.S. response: "To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack
would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war." John Foster
Dulles & John M. Allison, Telegram to Dean Acheson and Dean Rusk, June 25, 1950 (one
day after the North Korean invasion began), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org
/whistlestodstudv collections/korea/large/weekI /elsv 3 I .htm.
Truman regarded the
Korean invasion as the beginning of general Soviet aggression and expansion in the Far East.
See generally Philip C. Jessup, Memorandum of Conversation, June 25, 1950, available at
http:llwww.trumanlibrary.orgiwhistlestop/study collections/koredlarpe/week l k w 4 I .htm
(summarizing discussion between Truman and his advisers about the Korean situation, its
implications for China, Formosa, and Southeast Asia, and plans to strike at Soviet airbases
and ships in the Pacific Ocean).
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without Congress; he35had already ordered American forces to defend
~ ~ would have
South Korea before obtaining UN a u t h ~ r i z a t i o nand
done so without receiving it.37 Likewise President George H.W.
Bush, despite obtaining UN authorization, sought and received
Congressional approval for the Gulf War.38
1.

Security Council Resolution 678

The Administration may argue that not only does UN
authorization give the President authority to act without Congress, but
that specifically, President Bush already has a UN mandate to invade
Iraq. This 1990 Resolution states:
The Security Council . . . Acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter.. . Authorizes Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq
on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements
Resolution 660 (1990) [calling for Iraq to withdraw
from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions,
to use all necessary means . . . to restore international
peace and security in the area.39
Congress stated in PL 102-1 that the President was
"authorized to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United

35. Truman, before the Korean War, had agreed that he must seek Congressional
authorization before committing U.S. troops to UN or NATO military actions. See Fisher,
supra note 13, at 124546 ("After Roosevelt's death, President Truman sent a cable from
Potsdam stating that all agreements involving U.S. troop commitments to the United Nations
would first have to be approved by both Houses of Congress.). See also id. at 1255-56 ("In
195 1, during Senate hearings on NATO, [Under Secretary of State Dean] Acheson . . .
acknowledged that the treaty does not compel any nation 'to take steps contrary to its
convictions, and none is obligated to ignore its national interests.").
36. Id. at 1261 (indicating that Truman had ordered American support of South Korean
forces, in the form of military supplies and air and sea cover, before the Security Council
authorized states to repel the invasion by North Korea).
37. Id.("After he left the presidency, Truman was asked whether he had been willing to
use military force in Korea without UN backing. He replied, with customary bluntness: 'No
question about it."').
38. PL 102-1 (1991).
"Section 2. Authorization for use of United States Armed Forces
(a) Authorization.-The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use
United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council
Resolutions 660,66 1, 662, 664,665, 666, 667, 669,670, 674, and 677."
39. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. SIRES10678 (1990).
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Nations Security Council Resolution 678,"40 and the subsequent
relevant Security Council resolutions referred to in Resolution 660
and thus incorporated into Resolution 678 (including those
establishing the Iraq weapons inspection regime), thereby extending
Congressional authorization to such subsequent, Security Council
resolutions. That this is so is indicated by the President's continued
reporting to Congress under PL 102-1's reporting requirements
regarding the United States' efforts to enforce those subsequent
Security Council Resolutions and Congress' acceptance of such

report^.^'
Nonetheless, while it appears that Resolution 678 may still be
in effect, and, further, a purely textual analysis of the Resolution may
support a broad interpretation of purpose extending even to
authorization of force for "regime change,"42nonetheless, a review of
that and the subsequent resolutions from the Security Council-along
with a reading of the debate surrounding the adoption of the
Authorization for Use of Force Against Iraq Joint Resolutionsuggest that it did not authorize, intend or even contemplate the use of
force against Iraq for "moral" reasons or purposes of "regime
change.'' The Committee concludes, therefore, that Resolution 678
does not provide authorization for the invasion contemplated by the
Bush Administration.

-

40. Id. [emphasis supplied].
41. See e.g., Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate January 23, 2002, Office of the White House
Press Secretary, January 24,2002:
"Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the Congress
fully informed, 1 am providing a report prepared by my Administration on the
status of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the
United Nations Security Council. The last report, consistent with Public Law
102-1, was transmitted on October l I, 200 1.
Sincerely,
GEORGE W. BUSH"
42. "From a purely textual perspective, that authorization seems to have few, if any,
limits. "Area" is undefined and could mean Iraq or the entire Middle East. "Restoring
international peace and security' could mean occupying Iraq, removing Saddam Hussein
from power, or bombing Iraq's military/industrial capacity." Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner,
Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and
the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J.I.L. 124 (Jan 1999), printed at http://www.asil.org
/aiil/lobel.htm93, at text accompanying footnotes 59 and 60.
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Security Council Resolution 1373

Even if UN authorization allowed the President to order
American forces into hostilities without Congress' approval,
Resolution 1373 passed in response to the events of September 11,
does not appear to the Committee to authorize the United States to
invade Iraq for the purpose of regime change or even moral reasons.43
In contrast, nothing in the plain, operative text of Resolution 1373
authorizes any state to invade Iraq absent a connection with 911
There are also other flaws with citing Resolution 1373 as a blank
check (e.g., the phrase "combat by all means" appears in the preamble
and is not binding). All this points to the fact that the Resolution
1373 does not authorize the proposed war against Iraq.

E.

1991 and 2001 Joint Resolutions of Congress

Congress has twice issued resolutions that might be used to
support a contention that Congress has already authorized a future
war against Iraq; yet, neither resolution currently applies. As noted
above, President George H.W. Bush sought and received
Congressional authorization for undertaking the Persian Gulf War's
Operation Desert Storm in January 1991 pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 678 in the form of PL 102-1 ("Authorization for Use of
While, as explained
Military Force Against Iraq Resoluti~n").~~
above, from 1991 to the present three Presidents have continued to
report to Congress under PL 102-1 regarding the United States'
efforts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678, and both the U.S.
and the British governments take the position that Resolution 678
continues in effect, neither the 1991 Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution nor Resolution 678 were designed to
authorize conquest of Iraq to achieve a change in regime.
More recently, in the immediate wake of 9/11, Congress
authorized the President to use armed force against "those nations,
43. Id.
44. See S.C. Res. 1373 resolving (that states shall suppress the financing of terrorist acts
(11). deny other support to terrorists or terrorist groups (721, cooperate with other states to
exchange information, become parties to relevant anti-terrorism treaties, and prevent abuse of
asylum laws by terrorists (73). No part of the text of the resolution urges or condones states
to invade other states to prevent terrorism), S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. SIRES11373 (2001).
45. Public Law 102 - 1, $2(b) (Joint Resolution to authorize use of military force
against Iraq) Jan. 14, 1991. "The President is authorized. . . to use United States Armed
Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) . . . ."
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organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks on September 11, 200 1."46
This sweeping resolution requires a connection with 911 1 and would
only authorize war against Iraq if the President had determined that
Iraq had "aided" in perpetrating the attacks. To date, the President
has not made such a determination. It is important to note that the
United States has not announced any causal link between the events
of 911 1 and Iraq; Vice President Cheney has acknowledged as much
e~plicitly.~'It is thus clear the 2001 Joint Resolution To Authorize
The Use Of U.S. Armed Forces Against Those Responsible For The
Recent Attacks Launched Against The United States does not extend
to authorize war against Iraq for the stated purpose.

F.

Congress ' Powers of Appropriation Are InsufJicient

Some scholars argue that appropriations are a sufficient check,
and the primary one intended by the Founders, against the executive
authority to initiate war-Congress may simply refuse funding for
further military operation^.^^ However, this check will often be
useless against the President. Under this theory, Congress may stop
military actions once troops have been committed. The action may
end, damage may be done, and lives (U.S. and foreign) may be lost
well before the withdrawal of funding is effective.49 It may also be
dangerous to withdraw funding once a large ground force has been
~ommitted.~' This view of war powers is backwards. Congress
-

-

-

-

-

46. United States Public Law 107-40, 92(a) (Joint Resolution to authorize the use of

U.S. Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the
United States) Sept. 18, 2001.
47. See note l
48. See Yoo, supra note 17 at 297 ("Recent events [i.e. United States-led military
operations in Bosnia] confirm that Congress fully understands that its appropriations power
may be used to check executive military operations.").
49. For instance, the Office of the Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice advised
President George H.W. Bush that he could send U.S. troops to Somalia on his own authority.
16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 9 (1 992) (cited by Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 18, at 500 n.5 1).
After a series of dramatic American setbacks, Congress directed the President to withdraw
forces from Somalia pursuant to its authority clarified by the War Powers Resolution. See
H.R. CON. RES.170, 103d Cong., 139 CONG.REC. 9039 (1993). One might imagine that
Congress could have ended the operation in Somalia (a military action far smaller than that
contemplated in Iraq) by withdrawing funding instead. Either way, this example suggests
that if the power to initiate war lies with the President, Congress has no effective check - it
can only limit casualties once hostilities have begun because it cannot stop them from taking
place.
50. Yoo concedes that Congress may be reluctant to deny appropriations because of the
risk of "creating the impression that they are leaving Arnerican troops at the front
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should not be in a position to decide merely how many casualties the
United States will accept but rather whether losses need be incurred at
all.
G.

Under the Constitution, the Proposed Invasion Is a War

Under the Constitution, President Bush would have the
unilateral authority to commit U.S. troops to Iraq if he could show
that such an action constituted repelling a sudden or imminent attack
or its modern day equivalent. Under the scenario addressed herein,
however, the Committee believes he must seek Congressional
approval. There are three reasons for this conclusion, which must be
read cumulatively:
(1) The scale of the endeavor strongly suggests the action is a
"war" under Constitution (although scale alone is insufficient to put
the matter into the legislative domain as the type of war requiring
Congressional authorization). The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia had "no hesitation in concluding that an
offensive entry into Iraq by several hundred thousand United States
servicemen. . . could be described as a 'war' within the meaning of
[the War Powers Cla~se]."~'(Congress is more likely to acquiesce to
unilateral executive decisions to deploy relatively small forces,52but
despite any such acquiescence, Congress cannot waive its
Constitutional war powers.)
The deployment of 200,000 or more troops (or, indeed, even a
"smaller" invasion in conjunction with massive air attack) is
practically and qualitatively different from the scale of other recent
U.S. military interventions, except for the Vietnam and Gulf Wars; in
each of these two conflicts, the President specifically sought and
received Congressional authorization. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution,
while passed by Congress as a reaction to largely fabricated events,
shows that even President Johnson believed he was Constitutionally
defenseless," but that "a failure of political will should not be confused with a constitutional
defect." Yoo, supra note 17, at 299. He assumes that the risk of withdrawing funding as
largely a perceptual or political danger, rather than one that may, in fact, involve the lives of
deployed troops.
51. See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1990). See also Bruce
Ackerman, Commentary: Bush Must Avoid Shortcuts on Road to War: President should not
try to sidestep Congress in any action against Iraq, L.A. T I M E SMay
, 3 1,2002, at B15.
52. Telman, supra note 24, at 168. "Although Congress has generally acquiesced in the
President's unilateral power to commit the Armed Forces to actions of limited scope, that
acquiescence in individual cases, no matter how numerous, cannot result in a transfer of war
powers from one branch of the federal government to another."
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compelled to attempt to obtain Congress' authorization before
beginning a full-fledged war in Vietnam. President Johnson likely
abused his authority to send troops to Vietnam. More important, in
the context of this discussion on the separation of war powers, is how
he might have abused his authority. President Johnson's actions, if
anything, affirmed the legitimacy of the War Powers clause because
he actively sought Congressional authorization for the Vietnam War.53
The invasion of Iraq for the purpose of regime change
(2)
is plainly not for the purpose of repelling a sudden or imminent
attack, as discussed above. Iraq has not, since the end of the 1991
Gulf War, used force against or directly threatened the United States
(aside from attacks on allied airplanes in the no-fly zones).
According to the National Security Advisor, any threat that Iraq poses
is not of an immediate nature; if it were, the President would have
proposed an immediate action, or, already acted on his own authority.
To deem an invasion of Iraq repelling a sudden or imminent attack
under these circumstances dangerously distorts the intent of the
Founders.
In the case of repelling a "sudden attack," or even the
(3)
modem day equivalent such as disrupting a terrorist operation about
to commence, time limitations help to provide an understanding of the
boundary between executive and legislative war powers. The
President has the authority and obligation to repel sudden attacks
because the unitary Executive can react more quickly than Congress.
In such cases there is time to deliberate. Perhaps a President who
fears that his war plans will be rejected would not want to subject
them to Congressional scrutiny. It is in precisely this situation,
however, that the decision is not the President's to make alone; he
s ~ ~only of the justness of the cause but the
must convince C ~ n g r e s not
legitimacy of the means.

53. Johnson's failing was that he was willing to use false information (allowing the
Pentagon to fabricate incidents suggesting North Vietnamese provocation) to get such
authorization. The President has an obligation to be truthful when exercising his Executive
and Commander-in-Chief war powers.
54. If the reasons for a ground invasion depend on top secret intelligence, and public
disclosure will compromise intelligence sources, then the President may provide this
information to Congress behind closed doors. See, e.g., the current Congressional
investigation of possible intelligence breakdowns before 911 1, which remained largely closed
to the public. Protecting intelligence sources may be a good reason not to reveal secrets but
does not justify the President acting without Congress' authorization.
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CONCLUSION

The Committee has set forth its reasoning and conclusion that
the President needs Congressional authorization to launch a largescale invasion of Iraq for the purpose of regime change or on "moral"
grounds set forth.55 Some may disagree with this conclusion.
However, when the President seeks to take the nation from a state of
peace to a state of war for reasons other than defense against actual or
imminent attack, however valid those reasons may be, the Republic
deserves-and
the Constitution requires-a
Congressional debate
over whether to authorize such a war. Swift action in defense of the
nation and enforcement of legislation are the President's obligations;
decision-making from reasoned deliberation and determining
America's long-term security interests is Congress'.
Administration officials, former White House officials,
members of Congress, and scholars have argued for and against
removing Saddam Hussein, and even those who agree he must be
ousted, disagree as to whether using ground troops and a massive air
assault in a large scale endeavor is the best means.56 As such, the
prudence of offensive military action-from the perspective of U.S.
national security-is
far from self-evident.
This controversy
necessarily requires open and public debate about the merits of a war
against Iraq to effect regime change. Such deliberation in Congress
and amongst citizens-before using force-is the hallmark of a
democratic republic, as conceived of by the Founders and written in
the Constitution. The President can best facilitate this necessary
debate and honor the Constitutional separation of powers by
requesting authorization from Congress for his proposed military
action before acting.
Dated: August 22, 2002

55. The Committee takes no position regarding the validity of those stated reasons.
56. These debates are not a matter of partisan politics. In addition to many Democrats,
former senior Republican officials who served during the Gulf War in the Administration of
G.H.W. Bush argue against a ground invasion of Iraq. See interviews with James Baker and
Brent Scowcroft, Frontline: Gunning For Saddam, Nov. 8, 2001 (arguing that Saddam
Hussein is not the greatest threat to U.S. security and arguing against a ground invasion).
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